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Executive Summary 
 
Why do governments subsidize education so heavily? This paper discusses the role of 
education subsidies as a redistributive device. We argue that promoting education 
may be a means to reduce income inequality. When workers of different skill levels 
are imperfect substitutes in production, an increase in the level of human capital in the 
economy reduces the return to education. High-skilled labor becomes less scarce, 
which reduces relative wages in the higher echelons of the income distribution, while 
low-skilled labor becomes less abundant, which increases relative wages at the 
bottom. The compression of pre-tax wages implies that a given inequality of after-tax 
incomes can be reached with a less progressive income tax. Hence, by promoting 
education, the distortions arising from progressive income taxation on productive 
effort may be reduced. Optimal redistribution policy faces a trade-off between the 
distortionary effect of progressive income taxation and the distortions arising from 
education subsidies.  Just like progressive income taxes, education subsidies entail 
distortions. The optimal subsidy to education induces individuals to over-invest in 
education. 
The optimal level of education subsidies crucially depends on three parameters: the 
extent to which education compresses the wage distribution, the distortionary effect of 
progressive income taxation, and the political desire to redistribute income. We 
discuss empirical evidence showing that the economy’s average years of schooling 
has a strong effect on pre-tax income inequality. Using these estimates, and taking the 
progressivity of income taxation as a proxy for the political desire to redistribute 
income, we compute for a number of OECD countries the level of education subsidies 
that could be justified on redistributive grounds. For the mean level of progressivity of 
income taxes in OECD countries, subsidies to education for the purpose of 
redistribution should account for approximately 4.4% of GDP. This is close to the 
actual value of 5.5%. Moreover, in line with our argument, there is a clear relationship 
between the progressivity of the income tax and the level of education subsidies. Our 
argument for education subsidies thus goes a long way towards explaining the actual 
pattern and level of education subsidies in OECD countries. 
There is a counterforce that limits the redistributive virtues of subsidies to education. 
The large literature on the ability bias in the return to education shows that education 
and innate ability are complementary. Subsidies to education favor therefore 
predominantly the high ability types, leading to a widening instead of a compression 
of the income distribution. Our analysis suggests that these direct income effects may 
be quite strong, in particular when the price elasticity of education is low. Then, a 
given compression of the wage distribution can only be reached by providing very 
high subsidies. We argue that a clever policy design, like raising the quality of 
education and subsidies based on parental income, may mitigate these direct income 
effects while maintaining the indirect substitution effect on income inequality. We 
also discuss some political economy issues, such as the adequate level of 
centralization of decision making on education subsidies, and the time consistency of 
policy. 
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1 Introduction
Throughout the Western world, education is heavily subsidized. Public
expenditures on education amount to some 6% of GDP on average in
OECD countries and make up a considerable share of total public expen-
ditures. Public policy regarding education typically has a broad char-
acter. Subsidies are not confined to primary education; secondary and
higher education are also heavily subsidized. Moreover, governments do
not only support schooling opportunities of the disadvantaged. In prac-
tice, government programs that encourage education also favor the rich.
This chapter is concerned with the question of whether governments
should subsidize education so heavily and comprehensively?
The economics literature oﬀers two main arguments for subsidies to
education. Neither of them can fully account for the wide prevalence
of education subsidies. First, the endogenous growth literature has em-
phasized that investment in human capital may have positive spillover
eﬀects in production (Lucas, 1988, and Tamura, 1991). As these ex-
ternalities are not taken into account in individual schooling decisions,
education subsidies are needed to prevent underinvestment in education
and to promote economic growth. The externality argument calls for
subsidies directed to all educational levels and all individuals in as far as
externalities are present. However, the evidence for positive externalities
is mixed (Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999, Bils and Klenow, 2000, Krueger
and Lindahl, 2000, and Teulings and Van Rens, 2002). Second, capital
market imperfections may hinder poor individuals to finance educational
expenditures and cost of living while at school (Saint-Paul and Verdier,
1993, Perotti, 1993, and Benabou, 2000 and 2002). This argument is
hard to reconcile with the comprehensiveness of government subsidies
to education. If education subsidies only serve to attain equality of op-
portunity, subsidies targeted at the disadvantaged would be suﬃcient.
Moreover, the empirical evidence for borrowing constraints for educa-
tional choices is limited (Cameron and Heckman, 1998 and 1999, Keane
and Wolpin, 2001, Shea, 2000, and Cameron and Taber, 2000).
In this chapter, we discuss a new rationale for education subsidies.
We argue that education subsidies may be a part of an optimal redis-
tribution policy. Our argument hinges on general equilibrium eﬀects of
an increase in human capital formation. When workers of diﬀerent skill
levels are imperfect substitutes in production, an increase in the mean
level of human capital in the economy reduces the return to human cap-
ital. The supply of high-skilled workers goes up, reducing their relative
wages, while the supply of low-skilled goes down, increasing their relative
wages. Hence, the return to human capital and pre-tax wage inequal-
ity go down. The reduction in pre-tax income inequality implies that a
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given after-tax income distribution can be reached with less progressive
income taxes. Hence, by promoting education, the distortionary cost
of progressive taxation may be reduced. Optimal redistribution policy
faces a trade-oﬀ between the distortions arising from education subsidies
and the distortionary eﬀect of income taxation.
Following Becker’s (1983) eﬃcient redistribution hypothesis, our anal-
ysis contributes to the understanding of observed institutions. Insofar as
the political system has an incentive to consume Pareto improving pol-
icy reforms, our model provides a positive theory of the tax structure:
observed institutions should be constrained Pareto eﬃcient. We present
some empirical evidence that observed institutions fit our model reason-
ably well. Our theory predicts a correlation between the progressivity
of the income tax and the level of education subsidies. We present data
which give some support to this hypothesis. The level of this correlation
and the average level of education subsidies, 6 % of GDP, correspond
surprisingly well with the predictions of the model for reasonable pa-
rameter values. Also, our model explains why cross country diﬀerences
in the dispersion of disposable income are primarily due to diﬀerences
in the dispersion of gross income, not to diﬀerences in the progressivity
of the tax system.
Our theoretical analysis stands in the tradition of Mirrlees’ (1971)
Noble prize winning paper on optimal income taxation. Mirrlees consid-
ers the case where worker types are perfect substitutes, so that relative
wages for various ability types are independent of supply and demand.
Imperfect substitution between worker types is crucial for our analysis.
Previously, Feldstein (1973) has analyzed this problem, and a whole 1982
issue of the Journal of Public Economics is devoted to the issue (Allen,
1982, Stern, 1982, and Stiglitz, 1982). The conclusion of these early
contributions is that imperfect substitution between types of labor does
not make a great deal of diﬀerence for realistic values of the elasticity
of substitution. Our claim is that this conclusion is largely due to an
unresolved technical problem. Where Mirrlees applied a continuous type
distribution for the perfect substitution case, a continuous type produc-
tion function with imperfect substitution was not available. Hence, a
production function with a discrete number of types (in practice: two
types, see Johnson, 1984, for a model with three types) was applied.
Teulings (2000) shows that using a production function with only two
instead of a continuum of types yields a seriously downwardly biassed
estimate of the spill-over eﬀects of minimum wages. Our claim is that
the same problem applies for general equilibrium eﬀects of an increase
in the mean level of human capital, since large shifts in relative wages
within each of the types are ignored.
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Our analysis calls for subsidies to all levels of education. This redis-
tribution policy contrasts sharply with the usual idea of compressing the
wage distribution via compression of the distribution of human capital,
that is by putting special policy eﬀort in raising the education of the
least skilled. This latter policy, that relies on direct, partial equilibrium
eﬀects, might run into trouble due to adverse general equilibrium eﬀects
which are concentrated just above the bottom of the skill distribution.
The empirical evidence supports these ideas. There is a strong negative
relation between the first moment of the human capital distribution and
the second moment of the wage distribution, but there seems to be no
relation between the second moments of both distributions. This points
to promotion of education at all levels rather than at the low levels only.
However, there is a counterforce that limits the redistributive virtues
of subsidies to education. The large literature on the ability bias in the
return to education shows that education and innate ability are comple-
mentary (Angrist and Krueger, 1991). Subsidies to all levels of education
favor therefore predominantly the high ability types, leading to a widen-
ing instead of a compression of the income distribution. We face the
remarkable situation that the role of income and substitution eﬀects in
redistribution are reversed. Usually, redistribution is brought about by
the income eﬀects of a policy (e.g. progressive income taxation), while
the substitution eﬀects (less productive eﬀort) reduce their eﬀectiveness.
For education subsidies, it is the other way around. Substitution eﬀects
contribute to redistribution, while income eﬀects work in the opposite
direction. We derive the precise condition for education subsidies to
be redistributive. Furthermore, we discuss policies which may reduce
the adverse income eﬀects, while maintaining their eﬀect on the wage
distribution.
The potential role of education subsidies in redistribution policy has
become even more important in recent decades because of the widening
of the pre-tax income distribution in many countries. Increases in pre-
tax income inequality puts pressure on politicians to make the tax system
more progressive and, hence, more distortionary (see Milanovic, 2000, for
recent empirical evidence). We argue that promoting education may help
to reduce the political demand for additional redistributive measures.
Many studies relate the increase in income inequality to rapid skilled
biased technological progress. The increase in average years of schooling
has not been suﬃcient to prevent income dispersion from rising. In
Tinbergen’s (1975) terminology, education has lagged behind in the race
between technology and education.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the
main elements of our theoretical model, based on previous work, see Dur
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and Teulings (2001). Next, we review in section 3 the empirical evidence
on three crucial factors in our model: the degree of substitutability in
production between workers with diﬀerent educational attainment, the
degree of complementarity between education and innate ability, and the
sensitivity of educational attainment to financial incentives. Recently,
Teulings and Van Rens (2002) have analyzed simultaneously the evolu-
tion of log GDP per capita, income dispersion, and the supply of human
capital in a panel of 100 countries over the period 1960-1990. We discuss
their results in more detail. Section 4 presents our main results. First we
discuss eﬃcient redistribution policy in the case where the complemen-
tarity of schooling and innate ability is ignored. Here, we also present
some empirical evidence regarding the relation between education sub-
sidies and the progressivity of the tax system. Next, we examine how
optimal policy is aﬀected by allowing for the complementarity between
ability and education. Section 5 discusses some further policy implica-
tions of our analysis. Four issues are at stake here. First, we discuss
the proper level of centralization of education policy. As the eﬀective-
ness of education as a redistribution policy rests on an externality in
schooling decisions, education policy should be set at a suﬃciently cen-
tralized level for all externalities to be internalized (see also Fernandez
and Rogerson, 1996). Second, we analyze the consequences of a lack
of commitment on the side of the government regarding income policy.
We show that credibility problems bring politically feasible education
subsidies half way between a full internalization of all externalities and
a complete ignorance of externalities. Third, we address how to reduce
the adverse eﬀects of education subsidies on the income distribution as
a result of the complementarity between education and innate ability. A
clever policy design might help to overcome these adverse eﬀects, while
at the same time preserving the favorable eﬀect of the average level of
education on the income distribution. We discuss policies aimed at in-
creasing the quality of education and education subsidies which depend
on parental income. Finally, we discuss the role of non-linearities in
the income policy. Our theoretical analysis is based on the idea that
income policy shifts the mean of the skill distribution to the right, while
it leaves higher moments unaﬀected. This policy works by its indirect,
general equilibrium eﬀects. However, actual policies often aim at chang-
ing higher moments, in particular by raising the educational attainment
of the least skilled. Typical examples are programs like the EITC and
the New Deal. These policies are intended to compress the distribution
of gross income by compressing the distribution of human capital. How-
ever, as we will argue, they are likely to become the victim of their own
success. Since these policies raise the supply of human capital in the
4
lower tail of the distribution, the general equilibrium eﬀect of this policy
will reduce wages for these workers. Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical model
Our theoretical analysis follows previous work, see Dur and Teulings
(2001). Consider a society consisting of individuals who are born with
diﬀerent levels of innate ability, which we denote by a. They spend
the first years of their life at school. Let h be the number of years
spent at school. These two factors, innate ability and schooling, jointly
determine the level of human capital s with which the worker enters the
labor market:
s (a, h) = a+ (βh− ξa)− 1
2
ψ (βh− ξa)2 (1)
where β, ξ, and ψ are (weakly) positive parameters. We come to their
interpretation below.
In order to provide a clear cut separation between our model and
models based on capital market imperfections, we assume perfect cap-
ital and insurance markets. Individuals can borrow suﬃcient funds to
finance their consumption during their years of education at the going in-
terest rate. Also, they can insure perfectly the risk on their investment
in human capital due to the uncertainty about their life expectancy.
Hence, individuals invest in human capital up to the point where the
marginal cost equal the market rate of return to human capital. We
also abstract from production externalities in schooling decisions, like
knowledge spillovers.
After the investment in human capital, individuals start their work-
ing career. For the transparency of the analysis, we abstract from im-
perfections on the labor market. Workers therefore earn their marginal
product of labor and there is no unemployment. The individual’s log
wage rate w (s, µ) per unit of eﬀort depends on the individual’s human
capital s and on µ, the mean level of human capital among the workers
in the economy. Gross income is the product of this wage rate and the
eﬀort the individual chooses to provide. We simplify the analysis by
assuming that w (s, µ) is linear in s:
w (s, µ) = w0 (µ) + exp (−γµ) s (2)
where γ is a (weakly) positive parameter. For the derivation of w0 (µ),
see Dur and Teulings (2001). The partial derivative of log wages with
respect to human capital, ws = exp (−γµ) is a decreasing function of the
mean level of human capital in the economy. This captures the imperfect
substitutability between workers with various degrees of human capital.
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Were workers perfect substitutes, γ would be equal to zero. However,
since the substitutability between worker types is limited, an increase
in the supply of human capital in the economy (that is, µ going up)
reduces the wages of high skilled workers and increases the wages of the
low-skilled, or equivalently, it reduces the return to human capital. It is
convenient to normalize the human capital variable s such that in some
benchmark partial equilibrium of this economy µ = 0, or equivalently,
the derivative of log wages with respect to s equals unity, ws = 1: an
increase of s by 0.01 raises the wage by 1 %. Then, γ can be interpreted
as the compression elasticity: the percentage reduction in the return to
human capital, d lnws, per percent increase in the value of the stock of
human capital, wsdµ.
It is also convenient to normalize the ability measure a such that in
that same benchmark, βh − ξa = 0. The marginal contribution of an
additional year of schooling to the worker’s human capital is given by
the partial derivative of s (a, h) with respect to h:
sh = β [1− ψ (βh− ξa)] (3)
Since βh − ξa = 0 and since ws = 1, β measures the Mincerian rate
of return to schooling in the benchmark: one year of additional school-
ing yields a β ×100% higher wage. Empirical studies suggest β to be
about 10 % per year. The term −ψ (βh− ξa) in equation (3) captures
two essential features of the model. First, −ψβh captures the idea of
decreasing returns to further years of education; hence the parameter
ψ captures the extent to which returns decrease. Second, −ψξa cap-
tures the complementarity between schooling and ability. When ξ = 0,
the eﬀectiveness of schooling in raising skills does not depend on innate
ability. Hence, optimal years of schooling is independent of innate abil-
ity. When ξ > 0, people with higher innate ability benefit more from
schooling and, hence, they take up more years of schooling.
For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the direct cost of education and
focus completely on the cost of foregone labor income. This fits the
observation that the direct cost of education are, relatively, of minor
importance. Individuals choose their years of schooling as to maximize
their lifetime utility. The optimal years of schooling may vary between
ability types. When education and innate ability are complementary,
people with higher abilities go to school longer because they benefit
more from education, see equations (1) and (3).
A worker’s log disposable income d depends on her wage rate, her
choice of eﬀort, and the government’s income policy. As in Mirrlees’
(1971) seminal paper on optimal income taxation, the government can
observe neither eﬀort, nor innate ability, nor the skill level that is ob-
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tained by taking up education. It can only observe the years of schooling
taken by an individual, h, and her gross log income y. The income pol-
icy can therefore be contingent on these two factors only. We simplify
our analysis at this point by considering log linear income policies only:
d = d0 + dyy + dhh
In a non-interventionist, redistribution free equilibrium, we have: d0 =
0, dy = 1, dh = 0, so that d = y. We identify this non-interventionist
equilibrium as the benchmark to which we referred previously. dy is
Musgrave and Musgrave’s coeﬃcient of residual income progression and
measures the progressivity of the income tax. Progressive income tax-
ation implies dy < 1. The log linear specification implies a constant
elasticity of net with respect to gross income. This constant elasticity
specification implies that the marginal tax rate is increasing for dy < 1,
a feature which turns out to be important for the subsequent discussion.
The parameter dh measures the subsidy for taking up an additional year
of education relative to the net discounted value of disposable income;
dh < 0 implies a tax on education. Let λ be the cost of a year of ed-
ucation relative to the net discounted value of disposable income. In
accordance with standard human capital theory, it has two components,
the real interest rate that has to be paid for postponing labor income
by staying at school for another year, and the rate of depreciation of
the human capital (individuals die sooner or later); λ will typically be of
the order of magnitude of 10 %. Hence, dh/λ measures the subsidies to
education as a share of total cost, or alternatively, the marginal subsidy
rate. Workers set the marginal cost of education equal to its return.
A subsidy to education dh will therefore raise the level of educational
attainment.
The government is assumed not to provide grants to students still
at school. Their net income is zero and they must finance their con-
sumption by borrowing. At first sight, this seems to be an important
limitation to our analysis. However, it is not. Due to the perfect nature
of capital markets, the introduction of a grant financed from a reduction
of dh would be oﬀset by a reduction of the take up of credit by indi-
viduals during their years at school, leaving their lifetime consumption
path, their years of education h, and their level of productive eﬀort un-
aﬀected. Hence, the eﬀect of grants for students is equivalent to dh > 0.
We incorporate education subsidies in the income tax system only for
analytical convenience.
Individuals set eﬀort as to maximize their utility. Hence, as in Mir-
rlees (1971), redistributive income taxes distort productive eﬀort, as
marginal revenue of eﬀort from the point of view of the individual is
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below that for the society as a whole. Similarly, a subsidy or a tax to
education distorts the take up of education. Policy makers face therefore
the trade oﬀ between eﬃciency and redistribution. The question of in-
terest is what combination of education subsidies (or: taxes) and income
taxation yields the lowest distortion for a given amount of redistribution.
We refer to these combinations as constrained Pareto eﬃcient. The ad-
jective ”constrained” refers to information constraints on eﬀort, ability,
and skill, which limit the policy options that are available to the govern-
ment. Before discussing the nature of these trade oﬀs in greater detail,
we first discuss some empirical evidence on the three main parameters
of our model, γ, ξ, and ψ.
3 Some empirical evidence
3.1 The substitutability between worker types: γ
A crucial mechanism in our model is that an increase in the mean level
of human capital causes its return and, hence, wage inequality to fall.
Raising the average years of education in the economy makes low skilled
workers more scarce, raising their wages, while high skilled workers be-
come more abundant, reducing their wages. A necessary condition for
this substitution eﬀect is that workers with diﬀerent levels of skills are
imperfect substitutes in production. With perfect substitution between
skill types, relative wages would be independent of the supply of human
capital in the economy. Katz and Murphy (1992) provide some evi-
dence for imperfect substitutability between skill types. They estimate
the elasticity of substitution between high and low skilled workers from
time series data for the US. They estimate the elasticity to be 1.4, sup-
porting the idea of imperfect substitution between worker types. This
elasticity drives the negative relation between the return to human capi-
tal and its supply in the post war economic history of the United States.
Teulings (2002b) derives a relation between this compression elasticity
and Katz and Murphy’s elasticity of substitution between high and low
skilled workers:
γ =
1
Var [w]× ηlow-high
∼= 1
0.602 × 1.4
∼= 2
where Var[w] is the variance of wages and ηlow-high is the substitution
elasticity between low and high skilled labor. We take the standard
deviation of wages to be 0.60. Hence, when the mean years of schooling
increases from 10 to 11 years, and the initial return to education is 10%,
the return drops to 8%.
There is substantial direct evidence for a negative relation between
the stock of human capital in the economy and income dispersion. Tilak
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(1989) provides some early cross country evidence. In addition, there
are a number of case studies for various countries. Goldin and Margo
(1992), Goldin and Katz (1999), and Goldin (1999) examine the returns
to schooling and the dispersion of the wage structure in the US between
World War I and II. Educational returns clearly decreased during this
period and the wage structure narrowed. Goldin and coauthors relate
these developments to the enormous expansion of secondary schooling
beginning in the 1910s. Only after 1980, following a period of low inflow
into the university system, the return to education and the dispersion of
wages started to increase again (see Card and Lemieux, 2000). In most
other countries, the education revolution started later. Consequently,
the fall in the return to education and the narrowing of the wage struc-
ture also lagged behind (see Hartog, Oosterbeek, and Teulings (1993) for
the Netherlands 1960-1985; Edin and Holmlund (1995) for Sweden; Kim
and Topel (1995) for South Korea in sixties and seventies). All these
studies find that income dispersion is negatively related to the supply of
human capital.
Figure 1, taken from Teulings and Van Rens (2002), provides some
direct evidence on the relation between the return to human capital for
some 50 countries as measured directly from individual data on the one
hand, and on the mean level of education and on income inequality on
the other hand. There is a clear negative relation between the return to
education and average years of schooling, suggesting that skill types are
indeed imperfect substitutes in production, see Panel A. Panel B relates
the return to education to income inequality. There is a strong posi-
tive relationship. Taken together, the results suggest that by increasing
average years of schooling, income inequality may be reduced. Some
simple regressions based on the data presented in Figure 1 reveal that
the return to education is about 16% for countries with no education at
all, and decreases by about 0.7% for every increase of one year in the
average year of schooling.
FIGURE 1
Teulings and Van Rens (2002) analyze simultaneously the evolution
of log GDP per capita, the variance of log wages (which is derived from
Gini coeﬃcients), and the stock of human capital in a panel of 100
countries over the period 1960-1990. A theory of imperfect substitution
between skill types has simultaneous implications for the eﬀect of human
capital on income dispersion and on GDP. An increase in the economy’s
stock of human capital reduces the return to human capital and hence
income inequality. The marginal eﬀect of education on GDP should be
equal to the Mincerian rate of return to human capital, i.e. the eﬀect
of an additional year of schooling on log wages. Since this return is
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negatively related to the mean level of education in the economy, so
should be the marginal eﬀect on GDP:
logGDP = β0 + β1S −
1
2
β2S
2 (4)
d logGDP
dS
=
dw
dh
= β1 − β2S
where S is the average number of years of education h in the economy.
Hence, in a growth regression, we expect a positive eﬀect of increases
in the mean level of education, and a negative second order eﬀect of
increases in the mean level of education. This interpretation of the
role of human capital in the evolution of GDP contrasts sharply with
the endogenous growth literature, where the relation between school-
ing and growth is driven by externalities. For instance, in Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1999), a higher level of education makes the labor force
more able to deal with technological innovations. This yields a relation
between the level of education and growth, not the level of GDP, see
Krueger and Lindahl (2000) for a discussion. For the dispersion of log
wages, the following relation applies:
Var [w] =
Ã
dw
dh
!2
Var [h] =
³
β1 − 2β1β2S + β2S2
´
Var [h] (5)
The variance is a negative function of the average years of education in
the economy.
Table 1 provides evidence from regressions on panel data for log GDP
per capita and for the variance of log wages based on equation (4) and
(5). Panel A presents a regression for log GDP on average years of
schooling and years of schooling squared. The regression is run in first
diﬀerences, using a ten year time frame and controlling for the level of log
GDP in the previous period. The eﬀect of a year of education on GDP
according to these regressions is much higher than the Mincerian rate
of human capital as usually measured, about 24%. However, due to the
presence of the second order eﬀect, this return is measured at an average
level of human capital of zero. The coeﬃcient of the second order term
suggests β2 = 2× 0.8% = 1.6% per year increase in the stock of human
capital. The regressions presented in panel B on the variance of log
income (which is derived from the Gini’s) provide evidence for a negative
eﬀect of schooling on income inequality. We present three regression, one
in levels, one in first diﬀerences (to eliminate fixed country eﬀects), and
one where we allow only for a first order eﬀect in S, since the first and the
second order eﬀect are highly collinear. Using the latter regression, a one
year increase in average years of education reduces the variance of log
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income by 0.05. The eﬀect is somewhat larger in the equation measured
in levels. We can backout an estimate for β2 from these regressions.
Since Var[h] ∼= 12.6 and using β1 = 0.24, the coeﬃcient of the first order
term suggests β2 =
0.09
2×12.6×0.24 = 1.5% per year.
One can use these numbers to calculate the value of the compression
elasticity γ implied by the estimates. Starting from a return to human
capital of 10 % and using the 1.5 % decline per year of additional human
capital, the compression elasticity reads:
γ ≡ % fall return
% increase stock
=
d
³
log dw
dh
´
/dS
d logGDP
dS
=
β2
(β1 − β2S)2
=
0.015
0.102
= 1.5
Hence, Teulings and Van Rens’s estimate of the size of the compression
elasticity is broadly consistent with Katz and Murphy’s (1992) estimate
of the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled labor. We
apply a value of γ of 2 in our subsequent calculations.
Though the estimates of Katz and Murphy (1992) are largely consis-
tent with ours, our interpretation of the evidence is somewhat diﬀerent
from the usual interpretation in terms of a CES production function
with two types of labor. In this two type frame work, only the relative
wage of high and low skilled workers can change. Our interpretation
allows for a continuum of worker types, each endowed with its own level
of human capital s and with its own wage rate. In our economy these
workers have to be assigned to jobs, which diﬀer by their complexity,
see Teulings (2002b). The driving force of this model is the Ricardian
concept of comparative advantage: highly-skilled workers have a com-
parative advantage in complex jobs since skills have a greater eﬀect on
worker productivity in more complex jobs. In the Walrasian equilibrium,
highly-skilled workers will therefore be assigned to more complex jobs,
where their skills yield the highest return. A general increase in the
level of human capital reduces the return to human capital. The basic
mechanism at work is that a worker with a particular skill level will end
up in a less complex job when highly-skilled workers are abundant than
when they are scarce, since the distribution of job complexity is fixed
(a Leontieﬀ technology). Hence, the return to human capital, and thus
wage dispersion, decrease when the mean level of human capital goes
up. The size of this eﬀect depends on the degree of substitutability be-
tween skill types. The smaller the degree of substitutability, the more
the return to human capital decreases for a given increase in the stock of
human capital. This model exhibits the Distance Dependent Elasticity of
Substitution (DIDES) structure: the larger the ”distance” of two types
in terms of their level of human capital, the lower the substitutability
between worker types.
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The situation is illustrated in Figure 2. When an individual worker
raises her human capital from s to s + dµ while all other workers keep
their human capital constant, her wage goes up by ws (µ) dµ, which is a
shift along the curve. However, when all workers do the same, there is
an additional, general equilibrium eﬀect, shown as a twist of the curve
to a flatter position. The mean µ goes up by dµ. Hence, the wage
function twists and the return to human capital falls. This ”twisting” is
due to substitution processes. Since substitution eﬀects sum to zero (for
a constant return to scale economy), the workers with an above average
level of human capital will lose, while the workers in the lower tier of the
labor market gain. Somewhere in the middle, there is a break even point.
These indirect eﬀects of human capital acquisition on its return play a
crucial role in our analysis. They can be interpreted as a distributive
externality of schooling decisions. An individual’s decision to invest in
human capital increases the stock of human capital in the economy, and
reduces, therefore, the return on this capital. It is this externality that
provides a rationale for subsidies to education.
FIGURE 2
3.2 Complementarity between education and abil-
ity: ξ
The redistributive impact of education subsidies through general equilib-
rium eﬀects may be nullified, or even reversed, by direct income eﬀects.
When education and innate ability are complementary, education subsi-
dies disproportionally favor people with high innate ability as they take
up most education. This eﬀect is capture by the parameter ξ. We oﬀer
a simple interpretation of this parameter that provides a simple way to
estimate the parameter. Consider equation (3). Since both the cost of
education and the return to education are constant (because we assumed
w (s, µ) to be linear, so that ws is constant, and because of our normal-
izations), workers of each ability type a set h as to equate sh to some
constant. Hence, h is a function of a in market equilibrium, such that
βh (a)− ξa is a constant. Hence, by equation (1):
ds (a, h)
da
= sa + shh
0 (a) = sa + sh
ξ
β
= 1
In this world, we would never be able to establish the ”true” return to
education sh, even if we had perfect information on the worker’s innate
ability. The problem is that ability and schooling are perfectly collinear,
so we have no independent variation of h. Now, suppose that, from
the point of view of the researcher, this is too gloomy a picture of the
world. Workers do not set their years of education exactly as predicted
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by the model. Some have some kind of special preference for educa-
tion, and choose therefore to take more education. Others simply make
small optimization mistakes. This would allow us to identify sa and sh
separately, with sa = 1 − ξ.1 This suggests a simple trick to establish
ξ. Since ws is constant, we can approximate s by log wages w. When
we run two log wage regressions, one with only an ability variable, and
another with both the ability variable and years of education, the ratio
of both coeﬃcients on ability should be equal to 1− ξ.
Table 2 presents the results of this type of regressions. Ability is
measured by test scores. We use only males to avoid all the selectivity
issues that arise due to women’s labor supply decisions. We have data
for three countries, for each at two points in time: the UK (NCD dataset
and BCS dataset), the Netherlands (1983 and 1993), and the US (1974
and 1992).2 For each dataset, we present two regressions: one with
ability as the only explanatory variable, the other with both ability and
years of schooling as explanatory variables. For the UK datasets, we
have two variables for ability, one based on a math test the other on a
reading test. Both are included in the regressions. This evidence suggest
a value for ξ of about 0.3 to 0.6.
3.3 The sensitivity of education to financial incen-
tives: ψ
Another important parameter in our analysis is the elasticity of demand
for schooling with respect to its cost. This elasticity determines the
eﬀectiveness of subsidies in increasing the stock of human capital. The
sensitivity of education to financial incentives is important when innate
ability and education are complementary. Then, education subsidies
favor the rich because they take up most education, which reduces the
overall eﬀect of stimulating education on income inequality. The larger is
the elasticity of schooling, the lower are the subsidies that are required for
a given increase in the mean level of human capital, and hence the smaller
the adverse eﬀect of subsidizing education on the income distribution.
Workers set their demand for education h such that the marginal return
to education, wssh, is equal to its cost. A subsidy reduces cost and
therefore the marginal return. Totally diﬀerentiating equation (3) with
1This is most easy to see for the benchmark equilibrium, where βh (a)− ξa = 0,
so that the second order term in equation (1) can be ignored:
s (a, h) = (1− ξ)a+ βh
2We thank Peter Dolton for the regressions on UK data, Hessel Oosterbeek for
those on Dutch data, and Erik Plug for those on US data.
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respect to sh and h and some rearrangement yields for the benchmark
equilibrium:
shdh = − 1
ψ
d ln sh
where we use sh = β, and hence dsh/β = d ln sh. Since ws = 1 in
the benchmark, shdh is the relative wage increase due to dh years of
additional schooling. Hence, parameter ψ is the inverse of the elasticity
of the value of human capital with respect to the cost of education.
Stanley (1999) analyzes the eﬀects of the GI Bill education subsidies
for veterans from WW II and the Korean war on their educational at-
tainment. The GI Bill reduced the cost of education by 50 % for Korean
veterans and even by 60 % forWW II veterans. However, not all veterans
of the Korean war were entitled to this subsidy, depending on a com-
pletely arbitrary rule regarding the date of enlistment. This ”random”
selection provides a natural experiment for testing the eﬀect of financial
incentives on educational attainment. The eﬀects of these subsidies are
necessarily limited to veterans with higher educational attainment, since
they left the military at the age of 23. At that age, a substantial fraction
has completed its investment in human capital. This fits the observa-
tion: only 40 % of the Korean veterans who were eligible took up any
grants at all. Consistent with this observation, the veterans that took
up grants descended predominantly from parents with a higher social
economic status (SES). The 40 % that used the subsidies have increased
their educational attainment on average by 1/3 year. Were the subsidy
eﬀective for all education levels, the eﬀect would have been 1
3×40%
∼= 0.85
year. The elasticity of demand for years of schooling with respect to its
cost, shdh/d ln sh, can be derived by dividing through the subsidy rate
and multiplying by sh: 0.10×0.8550% = 0.17, or ψ = 6. For WW II veterans,
the data allow a more refined disaggregation by SES. There, the upper
quintile of the SES distribution achieves a gain in educational attainment
of even 2 years. Hence, the semi-elasticity is: 0.10×2
60%
= 0.33, or ψ = 3.
One might suppose that for the group of veterans the cost of education
has been higher than it would have been in case their educational career
had not been interrupted by the war. We use a value for ψ of 4 in the
subsequent calculations.
4 Eﬃcient redistribution policy
4.1 Eﬃcient redistribution without complementar-
ity: ξ = 0
We first discuss the results for the case where innate ability and edu-
cation are not complementary. In that case, all individuals choose the
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same years of schooling and education subsidies have no direct eﬀect on
the income distribution. The only way in which education subsidies af-
fect the income distribution is through general equilibrium eﬀects on the
labor market. If the compression elasticity is positive (i.e., skill types are
imperfect substitutes), education subsidies contribute to redistribution.
The optimal level of education subsidies depends on the political de-
mand for redistribution as well as the distortionary eﬀects of the policy
instruments.
The following equation describes for any level of income tax progres-
sion the constrained Pareto eﬃcient level of education subsidies as a
percentage of the cost of education:
dh
λ
=
"
1 +
η
(1 + η)2
γ
#
(1− dy) (6)
where η is the wage elasticity of eﬀort supply. In the absence of a strive
for redistribution, dy = 1, optimal education subsidies are equal to zero.
Hence, the redistribution free equilibrium, dy = 1, dh = 0, is constrained
Pareto eﬃcient. This mirrors the first theorem of Welfare economics:
with perfect markets, investment in human capital is Pareto eﬃcient. If
there is no demand for redistribution, the best a policy maker can do is
not to intervene in the market mechanism.
When the government wants to redistribute income from rich to poor,
both progressive taxes and education subsidies should be used, since in
(6), if dy < 1 then dh > 0. Education subsidies are optimal in our
model for two reasons, corresponding to the two terms within square
brackets. The first term captures the eﬀect that education subsidies
oﬀset the disincentive eﬀects of increasing marginal tax rates on school-
ing. Progressive income taxation implies that the benefits of education
(higher future earnings) are taxed at a higher rate than foregone earn-
ings. Therefore, individuals underinvest in human capital, which should
be corrected by providing education subsidies, see Bovenberg and Jacobs
(2001). The relevance of this eﬀect depends on the functional form of the
tax scheme. Our log linear system does indeed imply increasing marginal
rates. However, a linear scheme would not yield this eﬀect, since then
marginal rates were constant. Hence, we do not want to stress this eﬀect
here. It just shows up due to the convenient log linear specification of
income policy.
The second term refers to the general equilibrium eﬀects of education,
which are relevant when types of labor are less than perfect substitutes,
γ > 0. Then, a constrained Pareto eﬃcient income policy requires a
subsidy to education above the subsidy required to oﬀset the distortions
of the income tax. By encouraging schooling, wages are compressed,
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implying smaller pre-tax income inequality. Hence, a given after-tax
income distribution can be reached with less progressive income taxes,
and hence less distortionary cost of progressive taxation. Just like pro-
gressive income taxes, education subsidies entail distortions. The opti-
mal subsidy to education induces individuals to overinvest in education.
The distortion in the schooling decision due to the education subsidy is
traded oﬀ against the distortion in the eﬀort decision due to marginal
tax rates. The optimal redistribution policy mixes both distortions, in
line with the principles of tax smoothing. The higher the compression
elasticity, γ, the stronger the compression of relative wages by additional
investment in human capital, and hence the higher is the optimal value
of education subsidies. For the relevant range of η < 1, the optimal
subsidy is increasing in η. The more elastic the supply of eﬀort η, the
higher the distortion caused by marginal tax rates, and hence the higher
is the optimal subsidy to education. Note that the price elasticity of
the demand for schooling does not show up in this equation. Since the
schooling decision is distorted by both progressive taxation and subsidies
to education, the elasticity (measuring the size of the welfare loss) does
not aﬀect the ratio between income taxes and subsidies to education.
The subsidy to education can be interpreted as a Pigouvian subsidy
to oﬀset an externality in individual schooling decisions. When deciding
to take up an additional year of education, the individual raises the mean
level of human capital in the economy and therefore compresses wage
diﬀerentials. This generates both positive and negative income eﬀects
for other workers. The value weighted sum of these eﬀects is exactly
zero (as applies always for substitution eﬀects in constant returns to scale
economy). However, this compression eﬀect is a positive externality from
the point of view of the policy maker, who wants to redistribute income
from the rich to the poor and who can do so only at an eﬃciency cost
when using other instruments. We refer to this eﬀect as a distributional
externality.
4.2 Some empirical evidence on eﬃcient redistribu-
tion
When we follow Becker (1983) and interpret our model as a positive
theory of the policy mix used for redistribution, the model predicts
that countries with a stronger preference for redistribution and hence,
a stronger progressivity of the tax system, have higher public spend-
ing on education. Figure 3, taken from Van Ewijk and Tang (2000),
provides some evidence. There is a clear negative relation between the
progressivity of the income tax and the level of education subsidies.
FIGURE 3
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Remarkably, the actual level of subsidies to education and its relation
to the progressivity of income taxes is close to what our model predicts.
Clearly, when taxes are proportional (dy = 1), subsidies to education
should be zero. This is consistent with the data in Figure 3. The model
allows a crude calculation of the optimal level of subsidies to education
as a share of GDP. The eﬃcient level of education subsidies for redis-
tributive purposes depends on the values of η and γ (see equation (6)).
As discussed in the previous section, an empirically plausible value for γ
is 2. Similar to Diamond (1998), we assume the supply elasticity of eﬀort
η to be equal to a half. The coeﬃcient of residual income progression
(dy) is on average 0.85 in OECD countries (see also Figure 3). Hence,
for the average OECD country, imperfect substitution justifies a subsidy
to education of approximately 7 % of the cost of foregone labor income:
dh
λ
∼= 0.44 (1− 0.85) ∼= 7%
Suppose that the average worker takes up 10 years of education, which is
a reasonable value for OECD countries, and suppose that labor accounts
for 2
3
of GDP. Then, subsidies to education as a percentage of GDP
should be: 2
3
×10×0.44×0.10×(1− 0.85) = 4.4%. For the mean level of
progressivity of income taxes in OECD countries, subsidies to education
for the purpose of redistribution should account for approximately 4.4
% of GDP. This is close to the actual value of 5.5%. Our argument for
education subsidies thus goes a long way towards explaining the actual
pattern and level of education subsidies in OECD countries.
4.3 Allowing for complementarity of ability and ed-
ucation
When we allow for complementarity between education and innate abil-
ity, it is no longer clear whether education subsidies contribute to redis-
tribution of income from rich to poor. On the one hand, by stimulating
human capital formation, education subsidies reduce wage dispersion be-
cause skill types are imperfect substitutes in production. On the other
hand, the complementarity between education and ability implies that
individuals with high ability go to school longer. Since the amount of
education subsidies is increasing in the years of education an individual
takes up, education subsidies disproportionally favor the people with
high ability. Hence, the complementarity of education and ability may
cause education subsidies to increase income dispersion.
The constraint Pareto eﬃcient level of education subsidies allowing
17
for complementarity between ability and education is described by:
dh
λ
=
"
1 +
η
(1 + η)2
(1− ξ) γ − ψξ
1− ξ
#
(1− dy) (7)
where ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of educational attainment with
respect to the cost of education and where the parameter ξ measures the
degree of complementarity of innate ability and years of schooling in the
production of human capital. The higher ξ, the greater the diﬀerence in
the take up of education between high and low ability types. Hence, the
higher this parameter, the greater the direct, regressive eﬀect of subsidies
to education.
The first term between square brackets in equation (7) is again the
subsidy to education needed to correct for the distortionary eﬀect of
progressive taxation on the schooling decisions. Like in the previous
section, we ignore this eﬀect in the subsequent discussion. The second
term implies that if ψξ < (1− ξ) γ, then education subsidies are an
eﬃcient redistributive instrument next to progressive income taxation.
The condition has a simple economic interpretation. The parameter ξ
is the share of wage dispersion that is attributable to the cost of human
capital acquisition, while ψ is the inverse of the elasticity of educational
attainment with respect to the cost of education. Hence, the left hand
side is the adverse direct eﬀect of the subsidy: the increase in inequality
due to a subsidization of the cost of human capital acquisition per value
unit increase in the average human capital. The right hand side measures
the reduction in inequality: 1− ξ is the share of wage dispersion that is
directly attributable to ability diﬀerentials, while γ is the compression
elasticity, measuring the relative decrease in the return to these ability
diﬀerentials per value unit increase in human capital.
Whether the condition ψξ < (1− ξ) γ is satisfied is extremely sen-
sitive to the exact empirical values of the relevant parameters. For the
values discussed before, both sides of the inequality are just equal, which
implies that the direct income eﬀect of education subsidies is as large
as the indirect substitution eﬀect. Hence, education subsidies do not
contribute to redistribution. Much depends, however, on what one be-
lieves about the price elasticity of the demand for education. The higher
the elasticity, the more education should be subsidized. The intuition is
straightforward: the higher the elasticity, the lower education subsidies
need to be for a given compression of wages, the smaller is the direct
income eﬀect. Moreover, a clever policy design may mitigate the direct
income eﬀects while maintaining the indirect substitution eﬀect on in-
come inequality. Examples of this will be discussed in subsections 5.3
and 5.4.
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5 Further implications
5.1 The adequate level of centralization
Our argument for subsidizing education rests on an externality in in-
dividual schooling decisions. Individuals do not take into account the
eﬀect of their schooling on pre-tax wage inequality and, thus, on the
distortions arising from progressive income taxation. Decision making
must be suﬃciently centralized to internalize externalities.
Consider the case of a small district in a large country. Either labor
is mobile or there is free trade of products between districts, or both.
Hence, by the Heckscher-Ohlin factor price equalization theorem, rela-
tive wages are then determined by the nation wide skill distribution, not
that in the own district. Evaluated at the decentralized level, education
subsidies increase the dispersion of utility when ability and education
are complementary. Since the district is too small to have an eﬀect on
relative wages in the economy, the only distributive eﬀect stems from
the complementarity between ability and education in skill formation.
Without complementarity, education subsidies are only used to oﬀset
the distortionary eﬀect of increasing marginal tax rates on schooling de-
cisions. With complementarity, progressive taxation is combined with a
subsidy to education which is lower than the subsidy needed to oﬀset
tax distortions. When there is strong complementarity, even a tax on ed-
ucation may become constrained Pareto eﬃcient at the decentral level.
Clearly, taxing education contributes to redistribution as high-ability
types take up more education than low-ability types. The (local) distor-
tionary eﬀect on schooling decisions is traded oﬀ against the disincentive
eﬀect of the other redistributive instrument, progressive taxation. Since
the general equilibrium eﬀect of education subsidies on relative wages
is not taken into account at the decentralized level, subsidies are inef-
ficiently low. Hence, decentralization yields underinvestment in human
capital.
The case discussed above matches closely the US institutional struc-
ture, where decisions on education are made at the level of school dis-
tricts. The main diﬀerence is that the tax policy is decided predomi-
nantly at a federal level. This feature of the US system may strengthen
our result that decentralized bodies provide too low subsidies to educa-
tion. The reason is that central decision making on taxes introduces an
additional externality in decentral decision making, discouraging invest-
ment in human capital. While in the analysis above the direct conse-
quences of underinvestment in human capital for the government budget
are fully taken into account, this is no longer the case if local income is
subject to federal taxes. Studying these issue more fully would require
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the introduction of separate budget constraints for the school district
and the federal government.
5.2 Time consistency of the policy
So far, we have studied optimal income policy from the perspective of
an individual at the beginning of his life. Moreover, we have assumed
that the optimal income policy is set once and for all. In this section,
we relax both assumptions to gain insight into the political viability
of education subsidies in a world where the decisive voter has already
started his working career and cannot commit to future policies.
Consider a dynamic economy where old generations die and new gen-
erations enter the labor force. Inhabitants diﬀer along two dimensions.
First, they are either at school or working. Second, they diﬀer according
to their ability level. For simplicity, we assume that while at school,
inhabitants vote as if they are working. In this way we ignore slight
diﬀerences between the interest of those at school and those working.
The main interest is within generations: the low ability people have an
interest in past accumulation of human capital (because of general equi-
librium eﬀects on relative wages) and today expropriation of the fruits
of human capital (for redistribution).
The temptation to expropriate the fruits of past human capital for-
mation conflicts with the desire to stimulate current human capital for-
mation by young generations. In particular, consider the median voter
at a particular point in time. He is tempted to ignore the eﬀect of income
policy on schooling decisions. Since years of schooling are assumed to
be observable, this implies that he can fully expropriate the high abil-
ity types who have taken up more education (since innate ability and
education are complements). However, in that case, future generations
of new entrants will no longer invest in education. This will gradually
depress the mean education level among the workforce, thereby raising
gross wage diﬀerentials, at the expense of the median voter. Since the
median voter expects to live beyond today, he is also negatively aﬀected
by this long run negative eﬀect on his gross wage rate.
Interestingly, one can prove that when voters cannot commit on their
future voting behavior, the political process brings the economy exactly
half way between complete internalization of redistributive externalities
of schooling decisions and complete decentralization, where externalities
are fully ignored, see Dur and Teulings (2001). At that point, the temp-
tation to expropriate past investments in human capital is exactly oﬀset
by the fear of adverse general equilibrium eﬀects by lower future invest-
ments. The lack of ability to commit to future voting behavior works
to the detriment of the lower half of the income distribution, which gets
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less redistribution than with commitment. It is therefore in their inter-
est to seek ways to commit not to tax investments in human capital in
the future. For that reason, it may be important not to allow years of
education to be a variable in the tax system. As soon as that variable
enters the system, it opens the door for debate on heavier taxation of hu-
man capital in the future. The debate alone is enough to undermine the
credibility of the incentives for investment in human capital, and thereby
their eﬀectiveness. Therefore, it may be much better to frame subsidies
to the education system in the form of irreversible grants during the
years at school or of direct subsidization of the schools themselves, since
this type of subsidies are much more credible.
5.3 Subsidies to schools versus grants for students
The conclusion of section 4.3 that the direct and the indirect general
equilibrium eﬀects tend to cancel in the simple log linear set up, does
not imply that we should forget about raising the level of education as
an eﬃcient redistribution instrument. Education subsidies make most
sense if one can find policies that limit the direct income eﬀect while at
the same time maximize the eﬀect on the mean level of human capital.
Such more sophisticated policies are observed in practice. For instance,
in the present model, the only cost of education are foregone earnings,
keeping the quality of the education system fixed. One could extend the
analysis to the trade oﬀ between the quality and the direct cost of the
education system. Then, a typical policy parameter might be the quality
of education in general, and of primary education in particular. Leuven,
Oosterbeek, and Van Ophem (2002) show that there are considerable
diﬀerences in the quality of education across countries. An eyeball test
suggests these diﬀerences to be related to the amount of government
subsidy to the education system. The big advantage of raising the quality
of primary education is that it has no adverse income eﬀects and is likely
to raise the average skill level in the economy. However, depending on
the exact specification of the education production function s (a, h), the
greater quality of primary education might be just oﬀset by people by
reducing their years of schooling, since there marginal cost and revenues
remain equal. A general increase in the quality of education might be a
more attractive alternative, as it opens quality of education as a second
dimension for substitution next to years of education. The greater the
total elasticity of educational attainment to incentives, the cheaper it is
for the government to increase the average level of education by subsidies,
and in particular, the less subsidies need to be paid to high ability types
who take up a lot of education.
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5.4 Subsidies based on parental income
Another option for improving the eﬀect of a given amount of subsidy
on the average education level in the economy is to include intergener-
ational information in the subsidization scheme. The social economic
status of the previous generation is a good indicator of the expected
educational attainment of the next generation, partly by nature eﬀects,
partly by nurture, see Plug and Vijverberg (2002). On average, kids of
low education families drop out the education system at a younger age
and with a lower skill level. An optimal subsidy to education operates
at the margin, to invoke people to stay at school longer. The problem
is that the margin is located at a diﬀerent point for each skill group,
so that high skilled workers benefit along the whole range. By using
the educational attainment of the previous generation, subsidies can be
tailored more precisely to the margin, improving the ration of benefi-
cial incentive eﬀects versus adverse income eﬀects. In practice, this boils
down to subsidies that are conditional on parental income, an institution
that is widely applied.
5.5 Direct compression of the human capital distri-
bution?
Many policies are geared towards direct compression of the human cap-
ital distribution. The recent Luxembourg and Lisbon summit of the
EU have again focussed the eﬀorts for investment in human capital on
raising the level of education of least skilled. From a distribution point
of view, this seems to be an obvious idea as it raises the human capital
of the most disadvantaged group. However, a second thought reveals a
number of complications. First, relative to the free market outcome, it
is much simpler to raise everybody’s skill level by a bit than to raise a
particular group’s skill level by a lot, since the dead weight loss increases
quadratically with the deviation from the market outcome. Second, the
general equilibrium eﬀect of stimulating human capital accumulation in
the lowest strata of the distribution work perverse: they raise supply
in the lower part of the distribution, thereby reducing relative wages
of the least skilled, see Teulings (2002b) for a detailed analysis. Table
1 provides some, though far from conclusive empirical evidence on this
issue. The regressions in Panel B include the variance of education as
explanatory variable (Vt). The eﬀect of this variable on the variance of
log wages is close to zero. Hence, the direct eﬀect of a compression of
the variance of education on the variance of earnings is fully oﬀset by
adverse general equilibrium eﬀects.
The argument is very much comparable to the discussion on min-
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imum wages. An increase in minimum wages reduces labor supply at
the bottom of the labor market, thereby increasing the relative wages
of their best substitutes, slightly better skilled workers. The argument
is illustrated in Figure 4. Suppose that we introduce a minimum wage,
that eliminates the left tail of the human capital distribution, reducing
the eﬀective supply of low skilled workers. Firms will shift their demand
for these low skilled workers to the closest available substitute, slightly
better skilled workers, type s+. Hence, the introduction of the minimum
wage will increase the wages of type s+ workers substantially. Firms
that used these type s+ workers before the introduction of the minimum
wage will find their cost having been increased. They will substitute to
the closest substitute, type s++ workers, s++ being slightly higher than
s+. Hence, their wages go up, but by slightly less than the wages of
type s+. This yields the type of pattern shown in Figure 4, with large
spillover eﬀects of an increase in the minimum wage to workers earning
wages just above the minimum. This type of pattern has been docu-
mented for the United States by Lee (1999) and Teulings (2000, 2002a).
A decrease of the minimum wage by 10 % causes the wages of workers
earning slightly more than the minimum to go down by 8 % (Teulings,
2002a). Basically, all of the increase in inequality in the lower half of the
labor market in the United States during the eighties can be explained
by the fall in minimum wages.
FIGURE 4
Similarly, programs like the EITC and New Deal can be victim of
their own success. The large subsidies to the employment of the least
skilled raise their supply, and thereby invoke adverse general equilibrium
eﬀects, which might undo the gains of the initial subsidies. The only net
eﬀect would be an increase in the marginal tax rates for the better skilled
workers to finance the subsidies to the least skilled. Raising the level of
human capital of the workforce as a whole seems far more eﬀective from
a distributional point of view.
6 Conclusion
The general equilibrium eﬀect of investment in human capital provide
a forceful argument for the subsidization of education for a government
that wants to redistribute income. Previous studies on optimal taxation
have always downplayed the importance of general equilibrium eﬀects.
The reason that these eﬀects show up much more prominently in this
study is that we use a more realistic production technology, based on
comparative advantage of high skilled workers in complex job types.
Contrary to for example a two type CES technology, this production
technology implies that the whole wage schedule becomes flatter as a
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result of an increase in the average stock of human capital. An eﬃcient
redistribution policy should therefore combine progressive income taxa-
tion and subsidies to the formation of human capital. Crude calculations
suggest that this model provides a rationale for subsidies to the educa-
tion system of about the level that we observe empirically. Moreover, the
model suggests positive cross country relation between the progressivity
of income taxes and the rate of subsidization of the education system:
the more redistributive a country’s income policy, the higher will be both
the progressivity of the tax system and the subsidy to education system.
This relation is also borne out by the data, with a slope that fits the
theoretical predictions closely.
However, there is an eﬀect working in the opposite direction. Since
the take up of schooling is complementary to innate ability, the di-
rect eﬀect of a subsidy to education tends to favor high ability types.
Our overview of some empirical studies suggest that both eﬀects can-
cel. Much depends on what one believes about the price elasticity of
the demand for education. The higher the elasticity, the more education
should be subsidized. Moreover, the result that the direct and the indi-
rect more or less cancel does not imply that we should forget about the
argument. The simple log-linear income policy analyzed in this paper is
applied merely for reasons of tractability. One can think of more elabo-
rate schemes that increase the substitution eﬀects of education subsidies,
while at the same time reduce the adverse income eﬀects, in particular
policies aimed at raising the quality of education and grants for students
which depend on parental income.
The log linearity of the income policy imposes another strong restric-
tion. It implies increasing marginal tax rates (for dy < 1), oﬀending the
logic of the Sadka (1976) argument for low marginal rates at both ends
of the income distribution. Interestingly, this argument can be extended
towards education subsidies, but then reversed. Where in the case of
income taxation, the income eﬀects are desired for the purpose of re-
distribution while the substitution eﬀects only cause eﬃciency losses,
here the substitution eﬀects contribute to the redistribution while the
income eﬀects work in the opposite direction. Hence, the marginal rate
of education subsidies should be high at the bottom and at the top,
where they do not cause substantial income eﬀects since there are no
people earning less than the lowest or more than the highest income.
The previous argument regarding the quality of primary education ex-
ploits this idea at the lower end of the distribution. Where this idea
fits the layman’s intuition, its counterpart is more surprising. A subsidy
for top education programs has little adverse income eﬀects (since there
are not many people taking up more years of education), while it raises
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the average level of education. The production function applied in this
paper implies that all lower ability types will benefit from the general
equilibrium eﬀects of this policy, see Teulings (2002).
The analysis of the optimal functional form of taxes and education
subsidies has strong policy implication for programs like the EITC and
the New Deal, along the lines suggested by Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1999). These programs aim at a reduction of marginal tax rates
for the lowest ability types in order to combat low-skilled unemployment.
The government budget constraint then dictates that marginal rates
should be increased for higher ability types. The logic of the argument
in this paper suggests that this policy will be victim of its own success.
To the extent that the subsidies induce low ability types to go to work,
the relative increase in low skilled labor supply will reduce their wages,
thereby partially undoing the initial eﬀect of the subsidy. Stated more
crudely: there is limit to the demand for hamburger flippers. If we use
tax policy to increase their supply, sooner or later their gross wages will
fall. At the same time, the increase in marginal rates for somewhat
higher skill types, which is necessary to satisfy the government budget
constraint, reduces the incentive for investment in human capital, which
further aggravates the problem. This points to the need of a more formal
analysis of the functional form of the optimal policy.
7 Literature
Acemoglu, Daron, and Joshua Angrist (1999), How large are Social Re-
turns to Education? Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws, NBER
Working Paper MP/ W7444.
Allen, Franklin (1982), Optimal Linear Income Taxation with Gen-
eral Equilibrium Eﬀects on Wages, Journal of Public Economics, 17(2),
pp. 135-143.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger (1991), Does Compulsory
School Attendance Aﬀect Schooling and Earnings?, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 106(4), pp. 979-1014.
Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1999). Economic Growth.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Becker, Gary S. (1983), A Theory of Competition among Pressure
Groups for Political Influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3),
pp. 371-400.
Benabou, Roland (2000), Unequal Societies: Income Distribution
and the Social Contract, American Economic Review, 90, March 2000,
pp. 96-129.
Benabou, Roland (2002), Tax and Education Policy in a Heteroge-
neous Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth
25
and Eﬃciency?, Econometrica, 70(2), March 2002, pp. 481-517.
Bils, Mark, and Peter J. Klenow (2000), Does Schooling Cause Growth?,
American Economic Review, 90(5), pp. 1160-1183.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Bas Jacobs (2001), Redistribution and Ed-
ucation Subsidies, Mimeo, University of Amsterdam.
Cameron, Stephen V., and James J. Heckman (1998), Life Cycle
Schooling and Dynamic Selection Bias: Models and Evidence for Five
Cohorts of American Males, Journal of Political Economy, 106(2), pp.
262-333.
Cameron, Stephen V., and James J. Heckman (1999), The Dynamics
of Educational Attainment for Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites, NBER
Working Paper No. W7249.
Cameron, Stephen V., and Christopher Taber (2000), Borrowing
Constraints and the Returns to Schooling, NBER Working Paper No.
W7761.
Card, David (1999), The Causal Eﬀect of Education on Earnings.
Chapter 30 in the Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3, O. Ashen-
felter and D. Card (eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Card, David, and Thomas Lemieux (2000), Can Falling Supply Ex-
plain the Rising Return to College for Younger Men? A Cohort-Based
Analysis, NBER Working Paper No. W7655.
Diamond, Peter A. (1998), Optimal Income Taxation: An Example
with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates, American
Economic Review, 88(1), pp. 83-95.
Dur, Robert A.J., and Coen N. Teulings (2001), Education and Eﬃ-
cient Redistribution, Tinbergen Institute discussion paper 01-090/3, Am-
sterdam/Rotterdam
Edin, Per-Anders, and Bertil Holmlund (1995), The Swedish Wage
Structure: The Rise and Fall of Solidarity Wage Policy?, In: Freeman,
Richard B., and Lawrence F. Katz (Eds.), Diﬀerences and Changes in
Wage Structures, pp. 307-343, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Feldstein, Martin S. (1973), On the Optimal Progressivity of the
Income Tax, Journal of Public Economics, 2(4), pp. 357-376.
Fernandez, Raquel, and Richard Rogerson (1996), Income Distri-
bution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 111(1), pp. 135-164.
Goldin, Claudia (1999), Egalitarianism and the Returns to Education
during the Great Transformation of American Education, Journal of
Political Economy, 107(6), pp. S65-94.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence F. Katz (1999), The Returns to Skill
in the United States across the Twentieth Century, NBER Working Pa-
per No. 7126.
26
Goldin, Claudia, and Robert A. Margo (1992), The Great Compres-
sion: TheWage Structure in the United States at Mid-century, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 107(1), pp. 1-34.
Hartog, Joop, Hessel Oosterbeek, and Coen Teulings (1993), Age,
Wages and Education in the Netherlands, In: Johnson, Paul, Klaus F.
Zimmermann (Eds.), Labour Markets in an Ageing Europe, pp.182-211,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heckman, J.J., L. Lochner, en C. Taber (1999), Explaining rising
wage inequality: explorations with a dynamic general equilibrium model
of labor earnings with heterogeneous agents, NBER working paper 6384.
Johnson, George E. (1984), Subsidies for Higher Education, Journal
of Labor Economics, 2(3), pp. 303-318.
Katz, Lawrence F., and Kevin M. Murphy (1992), Changes in Rela-
tive Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 107(1), pp. 35-78.
Keane, Michael P., and Kenneth I. Wolpin (2001), The Eﬀect of
Parental Transfers and Borrowing Constraints on Educational Attain-
ment, Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper 01-018.
Kim, Dae-Il, and Robert H. Topel (1995), Labor Markets and Eco-
nomic Growth: Lessons from Korea’s Industrialization, 1970-1990, In:
Freeman, Richard B., and Lawrence F. Katz (Eds.), Diﬀerences and
Changes in Wage Structures, pp. 227-264, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Krueger, Alan B., and Mikael Lindahl (2000), Education for Growth:
Why and For Whom?, NBER Working Paper No. W7591.
Lee, David S. (1999), ”Wage Inequality in the U.S. during the 1980s:
Rising Dispersion or Falling Minimum Wage?”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, No. 3, Vol. 114: 941-1023.
Leuven, Edwin, Hessel Oosterbeek, and Hans van Ophem (2002), Ex-
plaining international diﬀerences in male wage inequality by diﬀerences
in demand and supply of skill, Mimeo, Tinbergen Institute, Amster-
dam/Rotterdam
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1988), On the Mechanics of Economic Devel-
opment, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22(1), pp. 3-42.
Milanovic, Branko (2000), The Median-Voter Hypothesis, Income
Inequality, and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Test with the Re-
quired Data, European Journal of Political Economy, 16(3), pp. 367-410.
Mirrlees, James A. (1971), An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum
Income Taxation, Review of Economic Studies, 38(114), pp. 175-208.
Perotti, Roberto (1993), Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution,
and Growth, Review of Economic Studies, 60(4), pp. 755-776.
Plug, Erik, and Wim Vijverberg (2002) Schooling, Family Back-
27
ground, and Adoption: Is it Nature or is it Nurture?, Journal of Political
Economy, forthcoming.
Sadka, Efraim (1976), On Income Distribution, Incentive Eﬀects and
Optimal Income Taxation, Review of Economic Studies, 43(2), pp. 261-
267.
Saint-Paul, Gilles, and Thierry Verdier (1993), Education, Democ-
racy and Growth, Journal of Development Economics, 42(2), pp. 399-
407.
Shea, John (2000), Does Parents’ Money Matter? Journal of Public
Economics, 77(2), pp. 155-184.
Stanley, Marcus (1999), College Education and the Mid-century GI
Bills, Mimeo, Harvard University.
Stern, Nicolas (1982), Optimum Income Taxation with Errors in Ad-
ministration, Journal of Public Economics, 17(2), pp. 181-211.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1982), Self-Selection and Pareto Eﬃcient Taxa-
tion, Journal of Public Economics, 17(2), pp. 213-240.
Tamura, Robert (1991), Income Convergence in an Endogenous Growth
Model, Journal of Political Economy, 99(3), pp. 522-540.
Teulings, Coen N. (1995), The Wage Distribution in a Model of the
Assignment of Skills to Jobs, Journal of Political Economy, 103(2), pp.
280-315.
Teulings, Coen N. (2000), Aggregation Bias in Elasticities of Sub-
stitution and the Minimum Wage Paradox, International Economic Re-
view, 41(2), pp. 359-398.
Teulings, Coen N. (2002a), The Contribution of Minimum Wages to
Increasing Wage Inequality, Economic Journal (forthcoming).
Teulings, Coen N. (2002b), Comparative Advantage, Relative Wages,
and the Accumulation of Human Capital, Tinbergen Institute discussion
paper TI 02-081/3, Amsterdam/Rotterdam.
Teulings, C.N. and T. van Rens (2002), Education, growth and in-
come inequality, Tinbergen Institute/Princeton University, Tinbergen
Institute discussion paper 02-001/3, Amsterdam/Rotterdam.
Tilak, Jandhyala B.G. (1989), Education and its Relation to Eco-
nomic Growth, Poverty and Income Distribution, World Bank, Wash-
ington.
Tinbergen, Jan (1975). Income Distribution: Analysis and Policies.
Amsterdam: North Holland.
Van Ewijk, C. and P.J.G. Tang (2000), Eﬃcient progressive taxes
and education subsidies, CPB Research Memorandum 170, The Hague.
28
 29
Figure 1. Return to education, education and inequality 
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B. Returns to education and inequality 
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Figure 2. Twisting of the wage function 
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Figure 3: Education subsidies and progressivity of the income tax in OECD countries 
 
*   change in the after-tax wage, % of change in the before-tax wage.
**  public expenditure, % of gross domestic product, in 1994.
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  source:  OECD (1996), Life long learning for all, Paris; Table 1.12 
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28) 
  
This figure has been taken over from Van Ewijk & Tang (2000), right 
panel of figure 1  
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Figure 4: The wage function before and after a minimum wage increase 
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Table 1 
 
A. GDP1 
 
        
  
  
Variable equation in 
first 
differences 
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B. Income inequality2 
 
 
    
variable equation 
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equation in first difs 
(1)                       (2) 
[ ])( 21 SVarS ββ  -0.08573 -0.09820 -0.05611 
 (3.05) (1.40) (1.96) [ ])( 222 SVarS β  0.00170 0.00320  
 (0.78) (0.66)  
    
tV  0.00105 0.00094 -0.00176 
 (0.33) (0.13) (0.29) 
    
 
 
 
1 Controls for year effects, year x S, and all variables in levels one year lagged. 
2 Controls for year effects, year x S, and type of income data. 
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Table 2: Regressions of wages on individual’s ability and years of schooling 
 
Regressions with schooling without schooling ξ 
 Ability 
(math) 
Ability 
(reading) 
Schooling Ability 
(math) 
Ability 
(reading) 
math reading 
UK NCD 0.0088 
(8.76) 
0.0079 
(4.89) 
0.0453 
(11.60) 
0.0121 
(12.47) 
0.0110 
(6.00) 
0.28 0.29 
UK BCS 0.0082 
(7.90) 
0.0038 
(3.77) 
0.0410 
(11.09) 
0.0105 
(10.15) 
0.0052 
(5.17) 
0.22 0.28 
Netherlands 1983 0.0041 
(2.92) 
- 0.0399 
(8.67) 
0.0092 
(6.96) 
- 0.56 - 
Netherlands  1993 0.0090 
(5.11) 
- 0.0444 
(8.15) 
0.0150 
(8.84) 
- 0.40 - 
US 1974 0.0366 
(5.90) 
- 0.0496 
(13.58) 
0.0757 
(13.32) 
- 0.52 - 
US 1992 0.0612 
(7.39) 
- 0.0920 
(18.87) 
0.1337 
(17.13) 
- 054 - 
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